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Go to visit a friend with vulvodynia who recently had a baby only to
find that she is desolate. I realise the baby–a little boy–died. We go
for  a  walk  together.  She  has  lost  weight  through  the  ordeal  &
actually looks on the edge of beauty for the first time. I feel like
saying something to this effect–like she had a great loss but gained
beauty as a result–but don’t think it would be appreciated. I know I
shouldn’t stay too long &, sure enough, when we get back to hers,
she indicates she needs for me to go soon. In her grief though, her
body  begins  to  spasm  uncontrollably,  describing  the  arc  of  the
nineteenth-century hysteric. I start to gently massage her back & it
brings her great relief as her body relaxes. I notice as I massage
her, that she has beautiful gold and silver studs, flowers, filigree on
different parts of her back. It describes a scene of immense beauty.
I comment on it.
Here are symptoms selected from a case study from each clinician:
She subsequently developed headaches, neck pain, panic attacks,
and full-blown post-traumatic stress disorder, along with significant
cognitive problems [...] As her neck pain worsened and spread to
her lower back, shoulders and arms, she noted increasing morning
stiffness,  and generalized  pain  and sensitivity  to  touch.  With  the
development  of  interrupted,  non-restorative  sleep  and  chronic
fatigue,  she  was  ultimately  diagnosed  by  a  rheumatologist  with
fibromyalgia (Scaer 107).
And:
The patient  suffers  from a permanent  headache of  a  constrictive
character [...] All kinds of sound are painful to his ear, and he does
his best to avoid them. It is impossible for him to fix his attention to
any  matter,  or  to  devote  himself  to  anything  without  speedily
experiencing  very  great  fatigue  [...]  He  has  insomnia  and  is
frequently tormented by horrible dreams [...] Further, his memory
appears to be considerably weakened (Charcot, Clinical 387).
In 2008, I was following a writing path dictated by my vulvodynia, or chronic vulval pain, and was exploring the possibility of my disorder being founded in trauma.
The theory did not, in my case, hold up and I had decided to move on when serendipity intervened. Books ordered for different purposes arrived simultaneously and,
as I dipped into the texts, I found startling correspondence between them. The books? Neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot’s lectures on hysteria, translated into English
in 1889; psychiatrist W.H.R. Rivers’s explication of a biological theory of the neuroses published in 1922; and trauma neurologist Robert C. Scaer’s interpretation, in
2007, of the psychosomatic symptoms of his patients. The research grasped my intellect and imagination and maintained its grip until the ensuing chapter was done
with me: my day life, papers and books skewed across tables; my night life, dreams surfeited with suffering and beauty, as I struggled with the possibility of any
relationship between the two.
Just as Rivers recognised that the shell-shock of World War I was not a physical injury as such but a trigger for and form of hysteria, so too, a few decades earlier, did
Charcot insistently equate the railway brain/spine that resulted from railway accidents, with the hysteria of other of his patients, recognising that the precipitating
incident constituted trauma that lodged in the body/mind of the victim (Clinical 221). More recently, Scaer notes that the motor vehicle accident (MVA) from which
whiplash ensues is usually of insufficient force to logically cause bodily injury and, through this understanding, links whiplash and the railway brain/spine of the
nineteenth century (25).
In terms of comparative studies, most exciting for a researcher is the detail with which Charcot described patient after patient with hysteria in the Salpêtrière
hospital, and elements of correspondence in symptomatology between these and Scaer’s patients, the case histories of which open most chapters of his book, titled
appropriately, The Body Bears the Burden.
In the case of both patients, there was no significant physical  injury, though both were left  physically,  as well  as psychically,  disabled. In the accidents that
precipitated these symptoms, both were placed in positions of terrified helplessness as potential destruction bore down on them. In the case of Scaer’s patient, she
froze in the driver’s seat at traffic lights as a large dump truck slowly reversed back on to her car, crushing the bonnet and engine compartment as it moved
inexorably toward her. In the case of Charcot’s patient, he was dragging his barrow along the road when a laundryman’s van, pulled at “railway speed” by a careering
horse, bore down on him, striking the wheel of his barrow (Clinical 375). It took some hours for the traumatised individuals of each incident to return to their senses.
Scaer  describes  whiplash  syndrome  as  “a  diverse  constellation  of  symptoms  consisting  of  pain,  neurologic  symptoms,  cognitive  impairment,  and  emotional
complaints” (xvii), and argues that the somatic or bodily expressions of the syndrome “may represent a universal constellation of symptoms attributable to any
unresolved life-threatening experience” (143). Thus, as we look back through history, whiplash equals shell-shock equals railway brain equals the “swooning” and
“vapours” of the eighteenth century (Shorter Chap. 1). All are precipitated by different causes, but all share the same outcome; diverse, debilitating symptoms
affecting the body and mind, which have no reasonable physical explanation and which show no obvious organic cause. Human stress and trauma have always
existed.
In modern and historic studies of hysteria, much is made of the way in which the symptoms of hysterics have, over the centuries, mimicked “real” organic conditions
(e.g. Shorter). Rivers discusses mimesis as a quality of the “gregarious” or herd instinct, noting that the enhanced suggestibility of such a state was utilised in
military training. Here, preparation for combat focused on an unthinking obedience to duty and orders, and a loss of individual agency within the group: “The most
successful training is one which attains such perfection of this responsiveness that each individual soldier not merely reacts at once to the expressed command of his
superior, but is able to divine the nature of a command before it is given and acts as a member of the group immediately and effectively” (211–12). In the animal
kingdom, the herd instinct manifests in behaviour that impacts the survival of prey and predator: schools of sardines move as one organism, seeking safety in
numbers, while predatory sailfish act in silent concert to push the school into a tighter formation from which they can take orchestrated turns to feed.
Unfortunately, the group mimesis created through a passive surrender of the individual ego to the herd, while providing a greater sense of security and chance of
survival, also made World War I soldiers more vulnerable to the development of post-traumatic hysteria. At the Salpêtrière, Charcot described in meticulous detail the
epileptic-like convulsions of hysteria major (la grande hystérie), which appeared to be an unwitting imitation of the seizures of epileptic inmates with whom hysteria
patients were housed. Such convulsions included the infamous arc en circle, or backward-arched bodily semicircle, through which the individual’s body was thrust, up
into the air, in an arc of distress only earthed by flexed feet and contorted neck (Veith 231). The suffering articulated in this powerful image stayed with me as I read,
and percolated through my dreams.
The three texts in which I remained transfixed had issued from different eras and used different language from each other, but all three contained similar and
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Charcot’s modernity is perhaps most evident in his understanding of equivalence between mind and brain, and his belief in what we now call “neuroplasticity”. Dealing
with two patients with hysterical (traumatic) paralysis, Charcot recognised the value of friction, massage, and passive movements of the paralysed limb, not to build
muscle strength, but to “revive” the “motor representation” in the brain as a necessary precursor to voluntary movement (Clinical 310). He noted the way in which,
through repetition, movement strengthens. The parallel between Charcot’s insight, and recent research and practice which indicates that intense exercise for stroke
victims assists the retrieval of motor programmes in the nervous system, in turn facilitating increased strength and movement, is quite astounding (Doidge Chap. 5).
Scaer, like Rivers before him, understands the “freeze” or immobility response to threat as a very primitive or arcane level of the survival instinct. When neither fight
nor flight will ensure an animal’s survival, it often manifests the freeze response, playing “dead”. After danger has passed, the animal might vibrate and shake,
discharging the stored energy, physiologically “effecting” its defence or escape, and becoming fully functional again. Scaer describes this discharge process in animals
as being “as imperceptible as a shudder, or as dramatic as a grand mal seizure” (19). The human, being an animal, also instinctually resorts to immobility when that
is the reaction that will best ensure survival. As a result of this response, energy that would have been discharged in fighting or fleeing is bound up in the nervous
system, along with accompanying terror, rage and helplessness. Unlike other animals that naturally discharge this energy when safe, humans often cognitively
override the subtle but essential restorative behaviours that complete the full instinctual response, leaving them in a vicious cycle of fear and immobility and
ultimately generating the symptoms of trauma.
Scaer writes, “this apparent lack of discharge of autonomic energy after the occurrence of freezing [...] may represent a dangerous suppression of instinctual
behavior, resulting in the imprinting of the traumatic experience in unconscious memory and arousal systems of the brain” (21). He proposes a persuasive model of
“somatic dissociation” in which the body continues to manifest a threat to survival  through impairment of the region of the body that perceived the sensory
messages, and disability that reflects the incomplete motor defence (100). He writes of his patients in a chronic pain programme: “We invariably noticed that the
patient’s unconscious posture reflected not only the pain, but also the experience of the traumatic event that produced the pain. The asymmetrical postural patterns,
held in procedural memory, almost always reflect the body’s attempt to move away from the injury or threat that caused the injury” (84).
Scaer’s concept of somatic dissociation, when applied to some of Charcot’s case studies, makes sense of their bodily symptoms. Charcot’s patient P— experiences no
life threat, but a shock that involves grief and shame (Clinical 131–39). On a fox-hunting outing, he mistakes his friend’s dog for a fox, accidently shooting it dead.
The friend is distraught, and P— consequently deeply distressed. He continues with the hunt, but later, when he raises his fire-arm to shoot a rabbit, collapses with a
paralysis of the right side (he is right-handed), and then a loss of consciousness, with consequent confused recollection. Charcot’s lecture focuses on the “word-
blindness” P— evidences, apparently associated with post-traumatic memory-deficits, but what is also arresting is the right-sided paralysis which lasts for some days,
and the loss of vision on his right side. It is as if the act to shoot again is prevented by a body, shocked by its former action. The body parts affected hold meaning.
In the case of the barrow man discussed earlier; although he has no lasting organic damage to his legs, nevertheless, his “feet remain literally fixed to the ground”
(Clinical 378) when he is standing, perhaps reproducing the immobility with which he faced the rapidly looming van as it bore down on him. His paralysis speaks of
his frozen helplessness, the trauma now locked in his body.
In the case of the patient Ler—, aged around sixty, Charcot links her symptoms with a “series of frights” (Lectures 279): at eleven she was terrorised by a mad dog;
at sixteen she was horrified by the sight of the corpse of a murdered woman; and, at the same age, she was threatened by robbers in a wood. During her violent
hystero-epileptic attacks Ler— “hurls furious invectives against imaginary individuals, crying out, ‘villains! robbers! brigands! fire! fire! O, the dogs! I’m bitten!’”
(Lectures 281). Here, the compilation of trauma is articulated through the body and the voice. Given that the extreme early childhood poverty and deprivation of
Ler— were typical of hysterical patients at the Salpêtrière (Goetz 193), one might speculate that the hospital population of hysterics was composed of often severely
traumatised women.
The traumatised person is left with a constellation of symptoms familiar to anyone who has studied the history of hysteria. These comprise, but are not limited to,
flashbacks, panic attacks, insomnia, depression, and unprovoked rage. The individual is also affected by physical symptoms that might include blindness or mutism,
paralysis, spasms, skin anaesthesia, chronic fatigue, irritable bowel, migraines, or chronic pain. For trauma theorist Peter A. Levine, the key to healing lies in
completing the original instinctual response; “trauma is part of a natural physiological process that simply has not been allowed to be completed” (155). The
traumatised person stays stuck in or compulsively relives trauma in order to do just that.
In 1885, Jean-Martin Charcot lectured at the Salpêtrière hospital in Paris, including among his case studies the patient he names Deb—. She resides more evocatively
in my imagination as “the lady in the carriage”, a title drawn from Charcot’s description of her symptoms, and from the associated photographs which capture static
moments of her frenzied and compulsive dance:
Now look at this patient [...] In the first phase, rhythmical jerkings
of the right arm, like the movements of hammering, occur [...] Then
after this period there succeeds a period of tonic spasms, and of
contortions  of  the  arm  and  head,  recalling  partial  epilepsy  [...]
Finally, measured movements of the head to the right and the left
occur;  rapid  movements  defying  all  interpretation,  for  I  ask you,
what do they correspond to in the region of physiological acts? At
the same time the patient utters a cry, or rather a kind of plaintive
wail, always the same [...] You see by this example that rhythmical
chorea may be in certain cases a grave affection [affliction]. Not that
it  directly menaces life,  but  that  it  may persist  over  a  very long
period of  time, and become a most distressing infirmity [...] The
chorea has lasted for more than thirty years [...] The onset occurred
at  the  age  of  thirty-six.  About  this  time,  when  out  driving  in  a
carriage with her husband, she fell over a precipice with the horse
and carriage. After the great fright which she had thus experienced
she  lost  consciousness  for  three  hours.  This  was  followed  by  a
convulsive seizure of hysteria major, by rigidity of the limbs of the
right side, and cries like the barking of a dog (Clinical 193–95).
I found this case study early in my reading of Charcot, but the lady in the carriage stayed with me as a trope of the relentless embodiment of trauma in its drive to be
conclusively expressed, properly acknowledged, and potentially understood. Hence the persistent pain and distress of Scaer’s MVA patients; the patients treated by
Rivers, with limbs and vocal-chords frozen in a never-ending moment of self-defence; the dramatic hysterical attacks of the impoverished patients in Charcot’s
Salpêtrière; and the rhythmical chorea of the lady in the carriage, her involuntary jerky dance a physical re-enactment of her original trauma, when the carriage in
which she was driving went over a precipice. Her helplessness in the event which precipitated her hysteria is a central  factor in her continuing distress, her
involuntary passivity removing her sense of agency and, like the soldier confined endlessly and powerlessly in the trenches waiting for inevitable terrifying action,
rendering her unable to fight or flee.
The fact that the lady in the carriage may be stuck in a traumatic incident experienced more than thirty years before attests to the way in which trauma insistently
pushes to be resolved. Her re-enactment is literal, but Levine acknowledges the relevance of a “repetition compulsion” (181), expressed originally by Freud as the
complementary insights. I found further correspondence between Charcot and Scaer in their understanding of the neurophysiology underlying hysteria/trauma.
Though he did not have the technology to observe it, Charcot insisted that the symptoms of hysteria were the result of real changes in the nervous system. He
distinguished between “organic” causes of disease, and the “functional” or “dynamic” causes of such disorders as hysteria and epilepsy: as he noted of the “hystero-
traumatic paraplegia” of a patient, “it depends upon a dynamic lesion affecting the motor and sensory zones of the grey cortex of the brain which in a normal state
preside over the functions of that limb” (Clinical  382). He proposed a potentially reversible “dynamic alteration” in the brain of the hysteric (Clinical  223–24).
Compare  Scaer:  “Clinical  syndromes  previously  categorized  as  ‘nonphysiological,’  ‘psychosomatic,’  or  ‘functional’  may  be  based  on  demonstrable  dynamic
neurophysiological changes in the brain” (xx–xxi).
Another link between the work of Charcot and Scaer is their insistence on the mind/body as a continuum, rather than separate entities. The perspicacity of the two
researcher/clinicians forms bookends to a model separating mind from body that, in the wake of the popularisation and distortion of Freudian theory, characterised
the twentieth-century. Said Charcot: “the physician must be a psychologist if he wants to interpret the most refined of cerebral functions, since psychology is nothing
else but physiology of a part of the brain” (cited by Goetz 32). Says Scaer: “The distinction between the ‘psychological’ and physical pathological manifestations of
traumatic stress, as suggested in the term ‘psychosomatic,’ needs to be discarded” (127). He proposes that, instead, we consider a mind/brain/body continuum which
more accurately reflects, “the pathophysiological, neurobiological, endocrinological, and immunological changes induced by trauma” and the bodily manifestations of
disease which follow (127).
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“compulsion to repeat” (19). This describes the often subtle way in which we continue to involve ourselves in situations that are replays of traumatic themes from
childhood—symbolic re-enactments. Levine revitalises the idea however, by focusing on the interrupted instinctual response that calls for physiological resolution: “the
drive to complete the freezing response remains active no matter how long it has been in place” (111).
The knowledge a traumatised person seeks is, in trauma, literally locked in the body/mind. It rises up through dreams and throws itself aggressively at one in
memories that are experienced as a terrifying present. It twists limbs in painful contractures and paralyzes the limb that was lifted in defence. The fear of turning to
face this knowledge locks the individual in a recurring cycle of terror and immobility. At its end-point, s/he survives in the pathological limbo of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD), avoiding any arousal that might trigger all the physiological and emotional events of the original trauma. The original threat or trauma continues to
exist in a perpetual present, with the individual unable to relegate it to the past as a bearable memory.
It is possible to interpret such suffering in many ways. One might, for instance, focus on the pathology of an apparent system malfunction, which keeps the
body/mind inefficiently glued to an unsolvable past. I choose to emphasise here, however, the creativity and persistence of the human body/mind in its drive to
resolve the response to trauma, recover equilibrium and face effectively the recurrent challenges of life. As well as physical symptoms which exact attention, this
drive or instinct might include the prompting of dreams and the meaningful coincidences we notice as we open our eyes to them, all of which can lead us down
previously unconsidered paths. Does the body/mind only continue to malfunction due to our inability to correctly decipher its language? In relation to trauma, the
body/mind bears the burden, but it might also hold the key to recovery.
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